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Introduction
Access to information is the ªrst “pillar” of the Convention on Access to Infor-
mation, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Envi-
ronmental Matters (Aarhus Convention),1 negotiated under the auspices of the
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE). The Convention
is often lauded as a unique international agreement in terms of integrating hu-
man rights and environmental protection: Article 1 of the Convention presents
the “right of every person of present and future generations to live in an envi-
ronment adequate to his or her health or well-being” as justiªcation for its
recognition, in environmental matters, of rights to information access, public
participation and access to justice.2 These Aarhus procedural rights bring corre-
sponding duties on states. Thus, for citizens’ access to information, there are in-
formation disclosure obligations on public authorities. Similarly, for citizen
rights to access to decision-making and justice in environmental matters, the
Convention sets out associated duties. The effective implementation of all the
procedural rights is seen as a condition for realizing the substantive right to an
adequate level of environmental quality. This claim about the necessary con-
joining of procedural and substantive environmental rights is also found in the
preamble to the Protocol on Pollutant Release and Transfer Registers (Kiev Pro-
tocol), which was adopted at an Extraordinary Meeting of the Parties to the
Aarhus Convention.3 The Kiev Protocol entered into force on 8 October 2009
* Thanks to Aarti Gupta and fellow participants of the Transparency in Global Environmental Gover-
nance Workshop at Wageningen University, 23–24 April 2009, for feedback on an earlier draft
of this article. I am also grateful to the Global Environmental Politics referees for their constructive
comments.
1. Aarhus Convention 1999 (adopted 25 June 1998; entered into force 30 October 2001).
2. Aarhus Convention 1999. This right is also stated in the seventh preambular paragraph of the
Convention.
3. Kiev Protocol 2003 (adopted 21 May 2003; entered into force 8 October 2009).
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and is presented by UNECE as the ªrst legally binding international instrument
allowing access to pollution inventory information.
“Aarhus environmental rights” have been lauded for increasing citizen ac-
cess to environmental information across Europe, helping to secure more trans-
parent and accountable regulatory processes. Indeed, UNECE presents the
Convention as heralding a more responsive relationship between people and
governments. As will be shown, the agreement has introduced innovative mech-
anisms for empowering public participation in national and international
decision-making, affording a special status to affected publics and nongovern-
mental organizations (NGOs). This in part reºects the efforts of environmental
NGOs in lobbying UNECE regarding decision-making entitlements for civil so-
ciety actors—lobbying which found fertile ground in the 1990s in the context of
external democracy promotion within Eastern Europe. Transparency, expressed
as information access, was deemed to be a necessary expression of, and condi-
tion for, democratic governance. However, transparency norms in the Aarhus
Convention have been framed mainly by a market liberal understanding in
which information disclosure obligations fall directly on public authorities and
only indirectly steer private sector institutions and actors. As will be argued here,
the construction and implementation of Aarhus rights according to this under-
standing has weakened the information access rights of citizens and affected
publics.
In this article, I examine the nature and scope of the information disclo-
sure obligations under the Aarhus Convention. After outlining the development
of environmental information disclosure provisions by UNECE, I brieºy set out
the relevant provisions of the agreement and characterize its construction of in-
formation disclosure rights. The application of these disclosure rights is then ex-
amined, drawing mainly on materials from the treaty secretariat and Parties to
the Convention, but also referring to the perspectives of relevant nonstate ac-
tors. An analysis of the experience so far of applying Aarhus information rights
pinpoints inherent (unexamined) inconsistencies in Aarhus informational gov-
ernance. These include the discretionary authority accorded to Parties, the exclu-
sion of private actors from mandatory duties regarding information disclosure,
and the indeterminate coupling of substantive and procedural rights. Ana-
lytically, I argue that these inconsistencies reºect a structural imbalance in the
articulation of Aarhus environmental rights between social welfare and market
liberal perspectives. While the Convention expresses, in Article 1, a socially just
commitment to decent environmental conditions for all, the differential obliga-
tions placed on public authorities and private actors reveal a more restricted
(liberal) understanding of rights. The article highlights various manifestations
of this normative mismatch.
Environmental Information Disclosure and UNECE
The drafting of the Aarhus Convention drew on ten years of experience of
environmental agreements within UNECE, as part of the “Environment for Eu-
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rope” process. While ostensibly a forum for pan-European economic integra-
tion,4 UNECE has developed a body of international environmental law cover-
ing transboundary aspects of air pollution, environmental impact assessment,
industrial accidents and the protection and use of shared watercourses.5 During
the East-West détente process of the mid-late 1970s, it was the selection of
transboundary air pollution cooperation as a negotiation issue for mutual gain
that favored UNECE as an institutional setting for environmental rule-making.6
Following the collapse of communist rule in Eastern Europe, in 1991 UNECE
co-initiated the Environment for Europe process to promote pan-European en-
vironmental cooperation. Environment for Europe discussions served as the im-
mediate backdrop for the two years of negotiations that produced the Aarhus
Convention, and it was at the Fourth Ministerial Conference (in Aarhus, Den-
mark in June 1998) under this process that the Convention was adopted.
According to UNECE, the Aarhus Convention was based in part on its ex-
perience of implementing previous environmental agreements, including the
application of information disclosure provisions.7 In an effort to codify these
various entitlements, in 1995 UNECE produced Guidelines on Access to Envi-
ronmental Information and Public Participation in Environmental Decision-
Making. The geopolitical context of regime change and independence in former
Warsaw Pact countries gave an unprecedented opportunity for the Commission
to set a regional governance agenda that, in the creation of new legal instru-
ments, fused democratic entitlements with environmental protection norms.
Between 1990 and 1995, 16 newly independent Central and Eastern European
states had joined UNECE and, at least symbolically, were keen to embrace dem-
ocratic values. In October 1995, at the Third Ministerial Conference under the
Environment for Europe umbrella, the participating environment ministers en-
dorsed the UNECE Guidelines. They also adopted the Soªa Ministerial Declara-
tion, which called for all countries in the region to ensure that they had an effec-
tive legal framework to secure public access to environmental information and
public participation in environmental decision-making.8
Thus, the ambitious multilateralism of UNECE in regard to the pan-Euro-
pean development of environmental information disclosure cannot be divorced
from its democracy promotion efforts in Central and Eastern Europe. Indeed,
Secretary-General Koª Annan introduced the Aarhus Convention as the most
ambitious venture in “environmental democracy” undertaken by the UN.9 From
1989 both the European Commission and the US funded major governmental
and nongovernmental capacity-building programs in the former communist
12 • Information Disclosure and Environmental Rights
4. The ECE includes 56 countries in the European Union, non-EU Western and Eastern Europe,
South-East Europe, the Commonwealth of Independent States and North America.
5. See http://www.unece.org/env/welcome.html, accessed 20 April 2010.
6. Wettestad 2000, 95. These negotiations resulted in the ªrst UNECE environmental treaty—The
Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (adopted 13 November 1979; entered
into force 16 March 1983).
7. Economic Commission for Europe 2000, 25.
8. United Nations Economic Commission for Europe 1995.
9. Economic Commission for Europe 2000, v.
countries, which included the creation in Budapest of a Regional Environmen-
tal Center for Central and Eastern Europe. In this context of external democracy
promotion, the development of the Aarhus Convention was notable for the ac-
tive role of transition countries in shaping its provisions, for these states were al-
ready adopting new environmental information and participation laws with an
explicit human rights component.10 It is not surprising, therefore, that Article 1
of the Convention champions a substantive environmental right—the equal en-
titlement of all persons, across generations, to a decent level of environmental
quality. This represents a strong conception of social welfare, which is compati-
ble, in principle, with socialist and social democratic norms from a range of Eu-
ropean political traditions. It implies regulatory constraints (to a greater or
lesser degree) on private investment and trade decisions generating signiªcant
environmental harm.
However, the substantive commitment to environmental justice in Article
1 has been at odds with the aggressive free market restructuring facilitated for
the new democracies by multilateral development banks (e.g. European Bank
for Reconstruction and Development) and private investment actors. This
means that the UNECE mandate for facilitating European economic develop-
ment—which in the preamble to the Aarhus Convention is interpreted as “sus-
tainable development”—has deferred in practice to a market liberal model of
economic development. Thus, the Commission’s commitment to information
disclosure as supportive of its core commitment to East-West cooperation has
mirrored Western economic liberalization and privatization objectives for tran-
sition countries, which have been set as conditionalities for European Union
and WTO membership. Within this dominant norm complex of neoliberalism,
information disclosure by governmental and private actors is market-correcting
rather than market-transforming: it is seen as reducing the incidence of environ-
mental externalities by rectifying information deªcits and asymmetries. In other
words, it is appropriate for states to facilitate information disclosure as a public
good to promote market efªciencies, but in the service of, rather than as a chal-
lenge to, proªt-motivated imperatives for economic growth.11
It is necessary to recognize, therefore, the historicity of the informational
governance12 formulated by UNECE for the Aarhus Convention. In the ªrst place,
the Commission articulated an inºuential variant of what, at the global scale,
Aarti Gupta labels “governance by disclosure”—a growing number of regulatory
forms (mandatory and voluntary) animated by assumptions of due process and
empowerment through information.13 For the Aarhus Convention, as will be
shown below, the procedural entitlements favoring public information access
are legally innovative. The causal assumption that information can empower
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10. Jancar-Webster 1998; and Stec 2005.
11. Examples of this perspective include Hamilton 1995; Tietenberg 1998; and Dasgupta et al.
2001.
12. By information governance I mean, following Mol (2008, 80), environmental governance in
which information, information technologies and information processes play a central role.
13. Gupta 2008. See also Florini 2007.
members of the public is explicitly made in the ninth and tenth preambular
paragraphs of the Convention, where improved access to information—con-
joined with public participation—is claimed to enhance public awareness and
understanding, the communication to decision-makers of matters of public
concerns, and the greater public accountability of public authorities. Many
Parties to the Convention, in their implementation reports, support the view
that information disclosure is enabling for their citizens.14 Within the wider re-
search community, there is also empirical support for this claim, though by no
means a scholarly consensus.15
Second, in keeping with market liberal notions of regulatory action, the
Aarhus Convention restricts its direct obligations to public authorities. While
“public authority” is understood in an expansive sense as all governmental au-
thorities and natural or legal persons with public administrative functions and
other environmental responsibilities, functions and public service providers
(Article 2),16 this deªnition clearly circumscribes its class of duty holders. Pri-
vately owned entities only fall within the immediate scope of the convention in-
sofar as they perform public functions deemed to be environment-related, such
as the provision of energy or water services. In terms of public international law,
the Convention resonates with those state-based rules which populate the man-
datory domain of governance by disclosure, notably treaty obligations on infor-
mation exchange, notiªcation, consultation and consent.17 Signiªcantly, when
UNECE considers the role of the private sector in the Implementation Guide to
the Aarhus Convention, it is in relation to non-mandatory notions of “corpo-
rate citizenship” and stakeholder engagement. Business and industry is men-
tioned as one of the “major groups” already identiªed by the Rio Declaration
and Agenda 21 at the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Develop-
ment.18 The claim that direct environmental information disclosure for private
operators can effectively be tackled by voluntary means (e.g. eco-labeling and
eco-auditing schemes) is stated explicitly in Article 5(6) of the Convention,
which relates to the public dissemination of information held by private
entities.
Information Disclosure Provisions in the Aarhus Convention
The Access to Information Pillar
As already mentioned, Article 1 of the Aarhus Convention establishes access to
environmental information as the ªrst of three procedural rights—for all
14 • Information Disclosure and Environmental Rights
14. Economic Commission for Europe 2000, 18; and 2008b, 21–22.
15. Compare, for example, the sanguine view of Stephan 2002 with the more skeptical outlook of
Fung et al. 2007.
16. Regional economic integration organizations that are Parties to the Convention are also
classiªed as public authorities; thus, ratiªcation of the Convention in February 2005 by the Eu-
ropean Community means that it has direct Aarhus obligations.
17. Louka 2006, 120–126.
18. Economic Commission for Europe 2000, 19–20.
persons—in support of the human right to a healthy environment. Articles 4
and 5 cover, respectively, the means by which environmental information can
be requested from public authorities and the obligations on Parties to ensure
that such authorities actively disseminate environmental information from a
variety of sources. Both articles include the provision that obligations are en-
acted “within the framework of national legislation,” which allows Parties
signiªcant discretion in disclosing information, including conditions for refus-
ing information requests (e.g. for reasons of national defense and security, com-
mercial conªdentiality and personal data protection). However, Parties are
obliged to interpret grounds for refusal in a restrictive way “taking into account
the public interest served by disclosure and taking into account whether the in-
formation requested relates to emissions into the environment.”19 In contrast to
the passive (request-based) disclosure obligations on public authorities con-
tained in Article 4, Article 5 covers the forms and categories of environmental
information which public authorities are actively required to collect and dis-
seminate. The priority accorded to public access places the onus on these au-
thorities to order and publish relevant environmental information, including
national state-of-the-environment reports, legislation and policy documents,
environment-related policy information, and information on pollution releases
and transfers.
Furthermore, Article 5 provided a legal basis for the Aarhus Parties to de-
velop the Protocol on Pollutant Release and Transfer Registers (PRTRs)—a com-
mitment agreed at the First Meeting of the Parties to the Aarhus Convention in
October 2002 at Lucca, Italy. The Protocol was adopted at an Extraordinary
Meeting of the Parties seven months later in Kiev.20 It is presented by UNECE as
the ªrst legally binding international instrument on pollution inventories, with
the goal of enhancing public access to information through the establishment
of coherent, integrated, nationwide pollutant release and transfer registers.
Parties are obliged to ensure effective public access to the information con-
tained in national registers, which follow a harmonized reporting scheme that
is mandatory, annual, multimedia, facility-speciªc and pollutant or waste-
speciªc. The Kiev Protocol is open to all states, so its contribution to informa-
tional governance transcends the membership of the UNECE.
The only other provision of the Aarhus Convention that has generated a
new legal instrument requiring the approval of its Parties is an Amendment
adopted at the Second Meeting of the Parties to the Convention, held in Almaty,
Kazakhstan, 25–27 May 2005. The Amendment, which is not yet in force, adds a
provision to the Convention (Article 6 bis) requiring each Party to “provide for
early and effective information and public participation prior to making deci-
sions on whether to permit the deliberate release into the environment and
placing on the market of genetically modiªed organisms.”21 This clause is de-
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19. Aarhus Convention 1999, Article 4(2).
20. Kiev Protocol 2003.
21. United Nations Economic and Social Council 2005, Article 6 bis(1).
signed to render more precise a reference to genetically modiªed organisms in
Article 6(11) of the Convention, which had deliberately been left vague in its
drafting in recognition of the political difªculties at that time accompanying the
negotiations over what became the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety.22 In recog-
nition of the need to have non-conºicting national biosafety frameworks, the
Amendment to the Aarhus Convention calls for Aarhus Parties to ratify or ac-
cede to the Cartagena Protocol. Nevertheless, by complementing the informa-
tion disclosure provisions of the latter, the Amendment attests to the fact that
Aarhus transparency norms have a wider currency than the Convention.
Information Access as a Human Environmental Right
The Aarhus Convention is drafted in terms of human rights, declaring in its
opening article a basic right of every person to a healthy environment. Prior to
the Convention, a number of countries had already recognized such a substan-
tive environmental right in their national constitutions: the Aarhus formulation
extended this emphatically to international human rights law, as reafªrmed at
the First Meeting of the Parties in Lucca:
We recognise the close relationship between human rights and environmen-
tal protection. Through its goal of contributing to the protection of the right
of every person of present and future generations to live in an environment
adequate to his or her health and well-being, the Convention reºects this
link.23
Yet the Aarhus Convention is mainly concerned with procedural rights of citi-
zens, with access to information supportive of access to decision-making and
access to justice in environmental matters. It therefore expresses a particular
blend of human environmental rights, marking procedural entitlements as nec-
essary for the successful exercise of substantive environmental rights. As the ªrst
pillar, access to information may be interpreted as an indispensable prerequisite
for the other environmental rights in the Convention.24 Arguably, this implies
that the corresponding information disclosure obligations placed on the Con-
vention Parties and public authorities become critical to the successful function-
ing of the treaty.
The three pillars of the Aarhus Convention mirror the procedural entitle-
ments to information, public participation and justice expressed in Principle 10
of the Rio Declaration.25 There is also a semantic debt to another UNECE
agreement—the 1991 Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a
Transboundary Context (Espoo Convention). From this treaty, the Aarhus Con-
vention imports the broad notion of the public as “one or more natural or legal
16 • Information Disclosure and Environmental Rights
22. See Gupta 2010 for analysis of political conºicts around transparency in the Cartagena protocol
negotiations.
23. Lucca Declaration 2004, para. 6.
24. Hayward 2005, 178.
25. Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (UN Doc. A/CONF.151/26/REV.1).
persons” adding, for emphasis, associations, organizations or groups in accor-
dance with national legislation or practice.26 The Aarhus Convention also has a
separate formulation of “the public concerned,” encompassing those persons
likely to be affected by, or having an interest in, the relevant environmental
decision-making, including environmental NGOs.27 These expansive notions of
public actors are politically signiªcant, because Aarhus entitlements are ad-
dressed to persons regardless of nationality, residence or citizenship.28 At least
in principle, then, information disclosure (and other Aarhus) obligations on
public authorities are extensive and without discrimination.
Yet, Aarhus environmental rights straddle uneasily between, on the one
hand, their embodiment as procedural entitlements and, on the other, the so-
cial welfare aspiration, expressed in Article 1, to provide environmental quality
adequate to the human health and well-being of all persons. The UNECE as-
sumption that the former necessarily promotes the latter is asserted rather than
substantiated.29 In the ªrst place, the social welfare aim embodied in Article 1 is
short-changed insofar as there is no elaboration of its constituent standards or
regulatory signiªcance. Instead, there is in the rest of the treaty a textual “brack-
eting” of the Aarhus substantive environmental right, which preserves the lib-
eral political axiom that the state should not encroach unnecessarily on the eth-
ical domain of private life-choices and welfare preferences. Similarly, restricting
the subjects of Aarhus duties to public authorities means that private corporate
entities are shielded from direct obligations under the treaty: this is also consis-
tent with traditional liberal legal protections afforded to markets against gov-
ernmental interference.
Implementation and Compliance Experience of Aarhus Provisions on Information
Disclosure
The Aarhus Convention entered into force on 30 October 2001. As of 8 October
2009, there were 43 Parties to the Convention, 23 Parties to the Kiev Protocol
and 24 Parties to the Amendment on genetically modiªed organisms. Decision
I/8, adopted at the First Meeting of the Parties, requires Parties to the Conven-
tion to report on their implementation activities before the relevant Meeting of
the Parties. There have now been two reporting cycles: by the Second Meeting of
the Parties in May 2005, 24 out of 30 Convention Parties had submitted na-
tional implementation reports (NIRs), while by the Third Meeting of the Parties
in Riga, 11–13 June 2008, 35 out of 41 Parties had submitted NIRs.30 For each
reporting cycle, the Aarhus Convention secretariat is charged with producing a
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26. Espoo Convention, Done at Espoo Finland on 25 February 1991, Article 1(x); Aarhus Conven-
tion 1999, Article 2(4).
27. Aarhus Convention 1999, Article 2(5).
28. Aarhus Convention 1999, Article 3(9).
29. For example, Economic Commission for Europe 2000, 29.
30. Economic Commission for Europe 2005, 2; 2008b, 3. As of April 2009 four Convention Parties
have still to submit their second national implementation reports—Croatia, Lithuania, Luxem-
bourg and Spain.
synthesis report on implementation, but is limited by its mandate and resource
constraints in verifying the content of the reports—a constraint characteristic of
the implementation norms of multilateral environmental agreements.
There are three regional groupings in implementation capacity categorized
by the Aarhus Convention secretariat. First, the Parties from Eastern Europe, the
Caucasus and Central Asia (EECCA) are deemed to face common implementa-
tion issues on the basis of their shared experience as post-Soviet states moving
into democratic governance. These Parties are credited by the secretariat with
having made most progress with the access to information pillar in the Conven-
tion, in part enabled by signiªcant capacity-building for implementation ªn-
anced since 1999 by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
(OCSE). OCSE has supported the creation of Aarhus Centers and Public Envi-
ronmental Information Centers—for awareness-raising, training and communi-
cations activities—in Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kyrgyz-
stan and Tajikistan.31
In the second regional grouping—the European Union (EU) countries
and Norway—implementation of information access provisions are more ad-
vanced, given prevailing legislation and more mature democratic systems. Fur-
thermore, European Community ratiªcation of the Aarhus Convention means
that it is now binding on Community authorities and on Member States, har-
monizing the implementation of the Convention across the European Union.
Thus, Regulation (EC) No. 1367/2006 applying the Aarhus Convention to
Community institutions and bodies was adopted in September 2006. The Euro-
pean Commission subsequently published Directives designed to align Com-
munity legislation with each of the three Aarhus pillars, of which Directive
2003/4/EC on public access to environmental information was adopted in Jan-
uary 2003, repealing a 1990 Directive on environmental information access.32
The third regional grouping—South-Eastern Europe (SEE)—covers three
Parties (Albania, Bulgaria and The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia)
deemed by the Aarhus Convention secretariat to share implementation chal-
lenges arising from their experience of the regional insecurity of the western Bal-
kans and their participation in Stabilization and Association Agreements with
the European Union. Indeed, the European Commission sponsors a Regional
Environmental Reconstruction Programme for South Eastern Europe, which
supports capacity-building for Aarhus Convention implementation.33
The two synthesis reports on implementation, prepared to date by the
Aarhus Convention secretariat, indicate that Parties appear to have fewest prob-
lems in implementing information disclosure obligations compared to the
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31. Economic Commission for Europe 2008b, 6–7; Organization for Security and Co-operation in
Europe 2008.
32. Commission of the European Communities 2008: 4. While a Directive (2003/35/EC) has also
been adopted in relation to the public participation pillar of the Aarhus Convention, the pro-
posed Directive on access to justice (COM (2003) 624) is still pending within the Community
legislative process.
33. Economic Commission for Europe 2005, 5–6; and Regional Environmental Reconstruction
Programme for South Eastern Europe 2007.
other two pillars of the Convention. For the provisions on access to information
upon request (Article 4), all submitted NIRs show relevant legislation in place.
However, with regards to EECCA and SEE Parties, some of the implementation
obstacles identiªed by the secretariat in the ªrst synthesis report (2005) recur
three years later in the second. These include legislative gaps and discrepancies
compared to Convention clauses, ambiguities over the meaning of “environ-
mental information” and the lack of awareness of citizens’ information rights.
There are also marked variations in the legal grounds upon which information
requests may be refused. Different legal approaches to implementing Article 4
are also found in EU countries and Norway, but within a more established cul-
ture of openness: the most signiªcant variation—and one that goes beyond
Aarhus freedom of information provisions—is the right of the public in Norway
to access information directly from private enterprises, rather than only from
public authorities.34 The reported experience of Parties in implementing the
Aarhus obligations on the collection and dissemination of environmental infor-
mation (Article 5) is similar across the two synthesis reports: appropriate laws
are in place, but many EECCA and SEE Parties noted procedural uncertainties
and resource constraints impacting negatively on active information disclosure.
In contrast, most EU countries and Norway reported no major obstacles to the
implementation of Aarhus provisions on information collection and dissemi-
nation: indeed, the Convention secretariat applauded progress by these Parties
in developing electronic tools for information disclosure and in setting up pol-
lutant release and transfer registers consistent with their ratiªcation of the Kiev
Protocol.35
Nevertheless, recent public communications to the Aarhus Convention
Compliance Committee reveal a more mixed picture—at least in terms of al-
leged breaches of information disclosure obligations of the Convention. It is
widely recognized that the Aarhus compliance mechanism is legally innovative
compared to other multilateral environmental agreements.36 Article 15 of the
Convention expressly allows for “appropriate public involvement” in a non-
confrontational, non-judicial and consultative compliance review mechanism.
As agreed at the ªrst Meeting of the Parties (Decision I/7), this has been inter-
preted to include the right of NGOs to nominate candidates to the Compliance
Committee, as well as the right of members of the public (including NGOs) to
submit communications regarding compliance by Parties and to take part in
Committee discussions with respect to their submission.37 By the end of 2008,
the Compliance Committee had only received one submission from a Party to
the Convention with regard to compliance by another Party, but had received
35 communications on compliance from the public.38 Over half of the public
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34. Economic Commission for Europe 2005, 7–9; and 2008b, 10–11.
35. Economic Commission for Europe 2005, 9–11; and 2008b, 11–13.
36. Morgera 2005, 140; and Mason 2006, 296.
37. Economic Commission for Europe 2004a.
38. See http://www.unece.org/env/pp/pubcom.htm for information on public communications to
the Aarhus Convention Compliance Committee.
submissions concern issues of public participation, which has led the Compli-
ance Committee to register concerns about the implementation of the second
pillar of the Convention.39 Yet, as Table 1 below indicates, there have also been
ten public communications regarding the compliance of Parties with the infor-
mation disclosure provisions of the Aarhus Convention and all these submis-
sions (from 2004 to the end of 2008) are allegations of non-compliance.
It can be seen from Table 1 that public communications to the Compli-
ance Committee about information disclosure have focused on Article 4—the
Convention provision on access to information. In response to the ªrst round
of public submissions in 2004–5, the Committee ruled two communications as
inadmissible under the terms of Decision I/7 and found three EECCA Parties—
Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Armenia—to be non-compliant with Article 4 obliga-
tions on Parties calling for public authorities to respond effectively to requests
20 • Information Disclosure and Environmental Rights
39. Economic Commission for Europe 2008c, 16.
Table 1
Public communications to the Aarhus Convention Compliance Committee (2004–
2008) citing Information Disclosure Provisions of the Convention (Articles 4 and 5)*
UNECE reference Party concerned Articles cited Received Status
ACCC/C/2004/
01
Kazakhstan 4(1) and 4(2) 07.02.2004 Findings
adopted
ACCC/C/2004/
03
Ukraine 4(1) 06.05.2004 Findings
adopted
ACCC/C/2004/
08
Armenia 4(1) and 4(2) 20.09.2004 Findings
adopted
ACCC/C/2004/
09
Armenia Articles 4 and 5 22.09.2004 Not
admissible
ACCC/C/2005/
14
Poland Article 4 04.07.2005 Not
admissible
ACCC/C/2007/
21
European
Commission
4(1) and 5(3) 14.08.2007 Findings
adopted
ACCC/C/2008/
24
Spain 4(8) 13.05.2008 Under
review
ACCC/C/2008/
28
Denmark 4(1) and 5(1) 07.09.2008 Under
review
ACCC/C/2008/
29
Poland Article 4 20.10.2008 Under
review
ACCC/C/2008/
30
Moldova 4(1) and 4(4) 03.11.2008 Under
review
*Note: References in these public communications to any other Convention Articles are excluded
here.
for environmental information. The constructive recommendations made by
the Committee to the three Parties emphasized necessary legislative and regula-
tory measures for compliance. By the 2008 Meeting of the Parties in Riga, the
Government of Kazakhstan was deemed to be compliant with Article 4 of the
Convention, but both Ukraine and Armenia were still judged not to be compli-
ant with Convention provisions on access to information.40 Public communica-
tions to the Compliance Committee in 2008 (Table 1) indicate that charges of
non-compliance regarding information disclosure are no longer restricted to
EECCA countries. For the complaint against the European Commission, the
charge by an Albanian NGO was that the European Investment Bank was not re-
leasing environmental information that it had requested, although the Compli-
ance Committee ruled that the European Community was not in a state of non-
compliance, as the information had eventually been provided.41 In the case of
Spain, the allegation was that a fee imposed by the Party for environmental in-
formation was unreasonable (in breach of Article 4(8)), while in the Danish
case, the communicant charged that the public authorities failed to discharge
both passive (Article 4) and active (Article 5) information disclosure responsi-
bilities concerning the administration of antibiotics in livestock. Both commu-
nications are under consideration by the Compliance Committee, along with
allegations of Article 4 non-compliance leveled by NGOs against Poland and
Moldova.
The Incompleteness of Aarhus Information Rights
It is arguably still too early in the lifetime of the Aarhus Convention to offer a
deªnitive assessment of its contribution to the information disclosure policies
and practices of its contracting Parties. Nevertheless, there is now sufªcient im-
plementation experience to pinpoint problematic areas in realizing Aarhus
rights and obligations regarding access to environmental information. I now
highlight three such areas: 1) the discretion accorded to Parties in interpreting
Aarhus rights; 2) the exclusion of private entities from mandatory disclosure du-
ties; and 3) the indeterminate coupling of procedural and substantive rights.
The Discretion Allowed to Parties in Interpreting Aarhus Rights
At several instances in the Aarhus Convention—including the speciªcation of
obligations for Parties for each of the three pillars—there are references to pre-
scribed action “within the framework of/in accordance with national legisla-
tion.” The Convention secretariat has interpreted this to mean that Parties are
allowed “ºexibility” in deciding how to implement selected Aarhus obliga-
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tions.42 This discretionary allowance seems sensible in view of the varying legal
systems and governance capacities of the various Parties across the UNECE re-
gion, but some early commentators on the Convention already anticipated
difªculties arising from the ambiguity of these phrases, including for the access
to information pillar.43 Implementation experience indicates that the discretion
allowed to Parties on Aarhus information provisions has been most problem-
atic for EECCA Parties, some of whom have struggled to accommodate freedom
of information within administrative cultures with an institutional memory of
secret and closed decision-making. As Stephen Stec notes, “access to informa-
tion, the right to disseminate information, and the control of information are
still contentious issues in many countries with a common legacy of strict infor-
mation control.”44 Of course, part of the administrative challenge facing public
authorities in EECCA (and SEE) countries is to respect the political legitimacy of
civil society actors as Aarhus rights-holders. For the ªve EECCA Parties facing
public charges of non-compliance under the Convention, each submission to
the Convention Compliance Committee was made by a domestic NGO.
Even for western European democracies and EU, though, it has been
claimed that the interpretive discretion allowed to Parties by the Convention
has diluted the force of its obligations. In particular, there are concerns that
rights to information and participation have sometimes been treated more nar-
rowly in implementing legislation than the letter or spirit of the Convention.
For example, EU Directive 2003/35/EC—transposing Aarhus public participa-
tion provisions to EU Member States—restricts the right to participate in envi-
ronmental decision-making to those affected by or with an interest in the deci-
sion, rather than to any member of the public (as set out in the Aarhus
Convention).45 This has implications for information access, as the public par-
ticipation provisions created by the Convention have corresponding informa-
tion disclosure entitlements. Aarhus-enabled public rights to information and
participation seem to be most at risk of truncation for decision-making with
transboundary environmental effects. While the Convention recognizes that
Aarhus rights have effect regardless of nationality (Article 3(9)), this principle of
non-discrimination runs against state practice not to grant decision-making
rights to foreign publics. Zwier argues that the activities of European export
credit agencies expose most vividly the implementation gap here, as Aarhus
Convention rights to access information and decision-making extend in princi-
ple to people abroad affected by the environmental effects of projects ªnanced
by such agencies. Yet in practice, these foreign publics typically have no access to
information on export credit agency activities impacting on their lives and live-
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lihoods.46 It is noteworthy also that, while the Compliance Committee did not
uphold the public communication of an Albanian NGO47 alleging that the Eu-
ropean Community (through the European Investment Bank) had been in
breach of information disclosure provisions, it did judge that the Bank had in-
terpreted too narrowly what constitutes “environmental information” in rela-
tion to ªnancing agreements.48
Discretion to each Party “within the framework of its national legislation”
is also expressed in Article 9(1) of the Aarhus Convention, concerning the ac-
cess to justice for those persons who consider that their requests for information
under Article 4 were not effectively met. Self-reporting by Parties on their imple-
mentation of Article 9(1) reveals a wide range of administrative and/or judicial
proceedings and bodies for review of appeals related to requests for informa-
tion.49 The routing of appeals through divergent legal vehicles justiªes the
ºexibility of implementation allowed by the Convention, although this makes
it difªcult to assess the equality of treatment of applicants between the Parties.
So far the Aarhus Convention Compliance Committee has not recorded a
signiªcant number of grievances over Article 9(1). Public communications have
alleged non-compliance with Article 9(1) by three Parties—Kazakhstan, Bel-
gium and Denmark. Of these, Kazakhstan was initially found by the Compli-
ance Committee to be in breach of this access to justice article (by denying ap-
peal standing to an NGO), but subsequently found to be in compliance
following the introduction of a new Environmental Code.50 The charge by an
NGO that Belgium did not provide sufªcient standing for environmental NGOs
for appealing information refusals (and other aspects of the Aarhus justice pil-
lar) was deemed not to be valid as it related to cases before the Convention had
entered into force in Belgium.51 Finally, the alleged non-compliance of Den-
mark with Article 9(1) is currently under review by the Compliance Committee.
This case is noteworthy as the communicant charges the Danish authorities
with having no independent and impartial review body to address the relevant
information disclosure appeal.52
The Exclusion of Private Entities from Mandatory Information Disclosure Duties
As already noted, Aarhus obligations fall directly on Convention Parties and
constituent public authorities, with privately owned entities having Aarhus re-
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sponsibilities only insofar as they perform public functions deemed to be envi-
ronment-related. Convention provisions on information disclosure addressing
the environmental impact of private operators (Article 5(6)) and products (Arti-
cle 5(8)) are framed in a non-mandatory, aspirational fashion. To be sure, the
obligation on Parties to establish pollutant release and transfer registers (Article
5(9)), as developed in the Kiev Protocol, is regarded as an important Conven-
tion mechanism for increasing corporate accountability.53 While the Protocol
has now entered into force, there are few signs within Convention practice of a
“hardening” of information disclosure duties on private entities. In its 2008 re-
view of implementation practice, the Aarhus Convention secretariat noted an
extensive preference amongst Parties for voluntary eco-labeling and environ-
mental auditing by the private sector, with mandatory disclosure of product in-
formation generally limited to speciªc sectors (e.g. European energy efªciency
requirements for household appliances and vehicles).54 Moreover, at the Third
Meeting of the Parties in June 2008, in deliberations over the 2009–2014 strate-
gic plan for the Convention, the European Union vetoed a proposal by Norway
to afford the public the right to access information directly from industry—a
proposal inspired by community-right-to-know entitlements enshrined in the
Norwegian constitution and Environmental Information Act 2003.55
Excluding private enterprises from mandatory information disclosure du-
ties is of course consistent with a market liberal model of corporate social re-
sponsibility in which any information disclosure depends on the voluntary con-
sent of the operator.56 According to a recent international survey, the well-
established right to commercial conªdentiality established by this model rou-
tinely disables access to information on pollutants from industrial facilities.57
The right to conªdentiality of commercial information is also a justiªed legal
basis for public authorities to refuse requests for environmental information
under the Aarhus Convention (Article 4(4)(d)). This exemption is tempered in
principle by a public interest in information disclosure, but the great variation
in its legal framing by Parties risks an inequality in implementation practice. At
least in one case, there is also evidence that the discretion given to Convention
Parties in assigning private sector responsibilities has signiªcantly eroded an
Aarhus mechanism of corporate accountability. Under the access to justice pillar
of the Convention, members of the public “have access to administrative or ju-
dicial procedures to challenge acts and omission by private persons and public
authorities which contravene provisions of (. . .) national law relating to the en-
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vironment.”58 Thus, some Convention Parties—including Hungary, Latvia, and
Sweden—have legal mechanisms for facilitating the direct liability of private op-
erators for non-compliance with environmental law (including information
disclosure). However, in Regulation (EC) No. 1367/2006 applying the Aarhus
Convention to Community institutions and bodies, the European Union omits
the reference to private parties in its legal codiªcation of this article. For the Eu-
ropean Commission, this omission merely reºects the fact that Community in-
stitutions or bodies are necessarily public authorities, but as this includes them
acting in a legislative capacity, the exclusion is questionable.59 It reinforces a
market liberal perspective on regulatory authority in which private operators are
shielded from administrative and judicial challenges issuing from civil society
actors.
The Indeterminate Coupling of Procedural and Substantive Rights
The inºuence of a liberal rights-based paradigm also accounts for the indetermi-
nate coupling of Aarhus procedural rights with the substantive right referred to
in Article 1 and the seventh preambular paragraph of the Convention. In the
ªrst place, this reºects a liberal political aversion to prescribe any conception of a
good life for individuals who are deemed to exercise freely chosen life-choices.60
A Declaration made by the UK Government upon signing and ratifying the
Aarhus Convention reºects this, treating the human right to a healthy environ-
ment as no more than an aspiration, and according legal recognition only to the
rights of access to information, public participation in decision-making and ac-
cess to justice in environmental matters.61 Even for those Aarhus Parties that rec-
ognize legally this substantive right, there is extensive uncertainty about its con-
nection with the Convention platform of procedural rights. In the structuring of
their national implementation reports, Parties are requested to follow a tem-
plate provided by the Convention secretariat: this includes, at Section XXXII, the
request to report on how their implementation of the Aarhus Convention con-
tributes to the protection of the right to live in an environment adequate to hu-
man health and well-being. Of the 37 implementation reports received by the
Convention secretariat in the second (2008) round of reporting, 13 contain no
response to this request and the majority of the rest feature substantive right
statements that are cursory and vague. Interestingly, the recurring claim in
those reports that construct a more signiªcant response is that Aarhus proce-
dural rights contribute to fulªlling the substantive right by empowering civil
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society (Azerbaijan, Georgia, Slovenia, Ukraine), especially when that substan-
tive right has national constitutional protection (Belgium, Finland, Germany,
Kazakhstan).62
Second, the absence of substantive environmental standards in the Con-
vention is also a practical obstacle impinging on its commitment to human
rights, as it arguably reduces the scope for public deliberation on the appropri-
ateness of environmental decision-making according to competing social val-
ues.63 Information disclosure and public participation become more a means
for legitimizing rather than interrogating governance institutions and for bench-
marking public authorities against procedural check-lists rather than substan-
tive environmental standards. Advances in information and communications
technologies, which allow citizens to utilize complex information in a politi-
cally transformative way, may however increase the scope for citizens to explore
the conditions needed to realize environmental health and well-being for cur-
rent and future generations. Article 5(3) of the Aarhus Convention requires
Parties to ensure that environmental information progressively becomes avail-
able in electronic databases that are publicly accessible, and a majority of Parties
are now reportedly using electronic communications tools.64 Thus, it is becom-
ing more feasible for these Parties to advance “targeted transparency” in which
the holders of Aarhus rights are able to make reasoned judgments on speciªc
policy choices.65 Such moves would complement rather than supplant the gen-
eral information disclosure provisions of the Convention, and are in keeping
with its aspirations to environmental democracy.
Conclusion
Aarhus environmental rights have been lauded for increasing citizen access to
environmental information, and thus helping to secure more transparent and
accountable regulatory processes. The widespread adoption of the Aarhus Con-
vention is a testament to the successful diffusion of environmental protection
and democratic governance norms by UNECE. Parties to the Convention have
generally embraced the access to information pillar as a signiªcant political re-
source for citizens. I have argued here, however, that the information rights
given force by the Convention are rendered inconsistent in practice by three
properties: 1) the discretion accorded to Convention Parties in interpreting
Aarhus rights; 2) the exclusion of private entities from mandatory information
disclosure duties; and 3) the indeterminate coupling of procedural and substan-
tive rights. These constituent properties generate a structural imbalance in the
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articulation of Aarhus rights via a normative mismatch between the procedural
and substantive elements. The preoccupation in the Convention with proce-
dural entitlements ªts comfortably with existing liberal expressions of civil and
political rights in international and the domestic law of most UNECE states,
even as the bold declaration in the treaty of a universal human right to an envi-
ronment adequate for health and well-being encapsulates a more far-reaching
conception of social justice. In implementation practice, the tension between
these two perspectives is dissipated by the de facto marginalization of the
Aarhus substantive right.
The historicity of Aarhus informational governance is central to under-
standing the bracketing of its substantive environmental right. This is character-
ized, above all, by a geopolitical context featuring the spread of market liberal-
ism and representative democracy to Eastern Europe, as well as the embrace of
neo-liberalism by leading Western governments. Indeed, as Paul Langley ob-
served at the start of the century, the rise of transparency as an organizing princi-
ple in global environmental governance is closely associated with the partial
privatization of that governance, evident in the growth of voluntary forms of in-
formation disclosure (e.g. environmental auditing and management systems).66
As noted above, this ideological current has affected the treatment in the Aarhus
Convention of private entities, which (in contrast with public authorities) are
shielded from direct information disclosure duties concerning environmental
information. The other articles in this special issue indicate that a structured
preference for voluntary disclosure from private actors is typical of new trans-
parency regimes in global environmental governance.67 While the motives for
the move to transparency vary across different sectors and regions68—in the case
of the Aarhus Convention, the rationale was democratic capacity-building for
environmental governance—the routine disclosure of environmental informa-
tion by private corporations is rarely prescribed. Yet in the Aarhus Convention,
this sits uneasily with the substantive right to an environment adequate for hu-
man health and well-being, as Aarhus information disclosure (and other) rights
are thereby cut off from the private constellations of power they must breach to
be effective.
At the same time, even the mandatory disclosure duties on state-centered
actors in the Aarhus Convention are tempered by the discretion accorded to
Parties in implementing Aarhus obligations. Here the constraining normative
context is a global governance realm in which there is no overarching political
authority, such that multilateral cooperation must operate on the basis of the
consent of states (and state-centered organizations) to rules that constrain their
sovereign authority. The architects of the Aarhus Convention judged the discre-
tionary space allowed to Parties in interpreting Aarhus obligations to be neces-
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sary for their effective uptake across diverse national governance systems and
political cultures. In practice, as noted above, this seems to have diluted the
force of Aarhus information (and participation) rights, particularly for decision-
making with transboundary environmental effects, as foreign publics suffer
from a lack of speciªcation of their Aarhus entitlements. Once again, the
emancipatory intent of the Aarhus substantive right suffers, also because the dis-
cretion afforded to Convention Parties includes the scope to interpret how to
square Aarhus procedural obligations with the realization of substantive envi-
ronmental justice. Given the potentially far-reaching ramiªcations of the
Aarhus human right to ecologically adequate conditions of life, it is not surpris-
ing that few Parties have made more than a symbolic commitment to meeting
it.
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